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Taxonomy of Law and Legal Mapping
Patterns and Limits of the Classiﬁ cation of Legal Systems
Abstract. Attempts from the 17th century onward anticipate the 20th-century mood of legal mapping. They classify 
legal arrangements by languages, races and genetic roots, then by their ideologies and technicalities. Later on they 
do so by separating the Western from the Soviet/socialist law, by their correspondence to underlying general 
cultures, as well as according to legal families. It is the insufﬁ ciency of resorting to dichotomy contrasting the 
Western “Us” to any differing Eastern “Others” that has recently resulted in typologising in terms of the dynamism 
and directions of legal development in the duality of professionalism and traditionalism or in the cross-reference of 
what is established/stable and unestablished/instable, and of what is drawn from Western and non-Western sources. 
Material taxonomy cannot be accomplished in law through genuine class-concepts. Characterisation through 
concepts of order can be achieved at most. In want of any meta-system, cultures formed to idealise and hypostasise 
ideas of order by independent principles can provide no common basis of division for law. Accordingly, only some 
division to major and minor sets and subsets can be achieved. The own arrangement will be better cognised by 
other schemes’ understanding. The gradual transcendence of rule-fetishism by identifying law with some speciﬁ c 
culture may prevent the coming “clash of civilizations” from reaching aggressive self-assertion and care for the 
sustainability of the laws’ diversity.
Keywords: family resemblences, legal families, civil/common law, Western/Soviet law, characterisation/
deﬁ nition, comparative law theory, comparative judicial mind
1. Preliminaries
Applying a theatrical metaphor characteristic of the Baroque age, it is Leibniz’ ambition 
(1667) regarding the early recognition of the need to describe the “theatre of the legal 
world” that was transmitted to us, informing us that the more humanity’s intellectual world 
broadened throughout history, the more pressingly humanity felt the need to classify its 
diverse elements. For example, the English Saint German perceived the difference between
Roman English
laws, while also presenting the correlation between their development, as early as in 1531, 
pointing out that what is jus naturale in case of the former recurs as reason in the latter.1 
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1 Chr. Saint German: Dialogus de fundamentis legum Anglie et de conscientia. The Dialoges in 
English between a Doctor of Diunity, and a Student in the lawes of England. Londini, 1528. {Plucknett, 
T. F. T.–Barton, J. L. (eds): St. Germain’s Doctor and Student. London, 1974}, quoted–remarking that 
we remember now the moment underlying such development as the need of reasonable man–by 
Chloros, A. G.: Une interprétation de la nature et de la fonction de la philosophie juridique moderne. 
In: Archives de Philosophie du Droit III. Le rôle de la volonté dans le droit. Paris, 1958, 189.
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Seventy years later, in 1602 William Fulbeck described a legal world rooted in three laws,2 
such as the
                    
Anglo-Saxon Continental canon
ones; and a century later, in 1701 Lord Holt wrote that “the principles of our law are 
borrowed from the civil law, and therefore grounded upon the same reason in many things”.3 
This reﬂ ects Europe’s view of itself in the early modern age, which with respect to the 
worlds beyond the countries on the two sides of the Channel scarcely perceived anything 
more than the papacy’s somewhat comprehensive inﬂ uence. Yet the above division is 
typologically correct and valid up to the present day.
Almost two centuries later, in 1880 Glasson proposed4 a tripartite classiﬁ cation derived 
from historical origins again, namely, laws developing
from barbarian 
customary law
(English, Scandinavian, 
Russian)
from Roman law
(Italian, Romanian, 
Portuguese, Greek, 
Spanish)
from the former two’s 
amalgamation
(French, German, 
Swiss)
–, a grouping that, not being based primarily on extant and actually prevailing features, has 
remained worthy of being taught up to our day. In a typologically characteristic manner, 
Glasson perceives, when mapping Europe’s inner division, the particularity of the Nordic 
and the Russian Plateau. Remarkably, the classiﬁ cation also draws the English and the 
Scandinavian legal systems within a single category while putting the French and the 
German together, differentiating both from the actual Romanist heritage.
2. Proposals
Drawing up a legal map of the Earth–by classifying the various legal systems according to 
the lasting features of family resemblance(s) expressed by their basic mission, form, 
structure and mode of operation–would be a task for 20th century comparative law, matured 
enough to have become a genuine movement by then.
When we look at such attempts from closer quarters, some standing representatives of 
the laws’ variety will be conspicuous from the beginning, placed in the centre as constant 
members that launch our interest in mapping at all, by deﬁ ning the typiﬁ cation’s entire 
contexture and ﬁ nal orientation. When the mapping is completed, further members will be 
attached mostly as additional items, exemplifying the law’s diversity, the effect of which is 
rather to testify to some loose interest in remote countries (by naming their species) than to 
cognise the world’s richness in actual depth and describe it exhaustively.
2 Fulbeck, W.: Parallele or Conference of the Civill Law, the Canon Law, and the Common Law 
of this Realme of England. Parts I–II. London, 1601–1602. Cf. also <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
William_Fulbecke>.
3 In: Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472, 482 (1701).
4 Glasson, E.-D. : Le mariage civil et le divorce dans les principaux pays de l’Europe, précédé 
d’un aperçu sur les origines du droit civil moderne: Études de législation comparée. Paris, 1879.
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So, in the early 20th century Esmein (1905) thought, for instance, that language and 
species would constitute the most appropriate basis of the divisio5–
Romanist
(French, Belgian, 
Italian,
Spanish, Portuguese, 
Romanian,
Central & South-
American)
Germanic
(Scandinavian, 
Austrian, 
Hungarian)
Anglo-Saxon
(English, 
American,
English-speaking 
colonies)
Slavic Muslim
–, which, despite being rather inﬂ uential for a while as an early attempt, proved to be too 
sketchy and limited in outlines. However, at the peak of European imperialism or politico-
economic expansion, this analysis theoretically encompassed the world through the historical 
prism of Europe. Interestingly enough, it also involved Arabic culture–having in mind its 
presence in the Hispanic Peninsula for centuries in the Middle Ages–as a partner on an equal 
footing.6 We see here for the ﬁ rst time the Germans separated as a block from the Roman 
legal tradition, perhaps owing to the clashes with which the German Empire, with the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy in the background, confronted the rest of the world. At least, there can 
scarcely be any other explanation in that allusion was also made to Hungarian law.
In another attempt at grouping, Sauser-Hall (1913) accepted the exclusive criterion of 
race as the principle for classiﬁ cation, in a manner not alien to the dominant spirit of the 
age7–
Aryan, Indo-European
• Hindu–Iranian
(Persian, Armenian)
• Celtic
(Celtic, Gallic, Irish, Gaelic)
• Greco–Latin
(Greek, Roman, Canonic, neo-Swiss)
• Germanic
• Anglo-Saxon
(English, Anglo–American,
new Saxon)
• Lithuanian-Slavic
(Russian, Serbo–Croatian, Slovenian,
Czech, Polish, ancient Prussian, 
Lithuanian, Ruthenian, Slovak, 
Bulgarian)
Semitic
(Amir, 
Egyptian,
Jewish,
Arabic-
Muslim)
Mongoloid
• Chinese
(Chinese, 
Indo-Chinese,
Tibetan)
• Japanese
barbarian 
customary 
(Negro,
Melanesian, 
Indonesian,
Australian, 
Polynesian,
American
& Hyperborean 
native)
5 Esmein, A.: Le droit comparé et l’enseignement du droit comparé. In: Procès-verbaux des 
séances et documents I. [Congrès international du droit comparé tenu à Paris du 31 juillet au 4 août 
1900], Paris, 1905, 451 et seq.
6 Cf., e.g. Brague, R.: Europe. La voie romaine. Paris, 1992.
7 Sauser-Hall, G.: Fonction et méthode du droit comparé. Genève, 1913.
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–, and his categorisation remains of a revealing force in several respects notwithstanding 
the fact that it keeps silence about the speciﬁ c similarities and differences in the legal nature 
of the arrangements that he grouped so. Nevertheless, he undoubtedly provided a pioneer 
attempt at describing the known totality of legal regimes in both their historical development 
and actual diversity on the globe. Actually, he drew a comprehensive picture of the popular 
force that may have generated known cultures, inserting for the very ﬁ rst time a “closing 
category” of visibly “mixed” contents in his scheme. He was also pioneering in drawing a 
broad and overall framework, albeit he too had a start from his own regime (labelled as the 
historical performance of peoples, to be identiﬁ ed as “Western” in a cultural sense later on). 
In this endeavour, he may have been guided by a logically inspired “aesthetical” wish that 
the borders of his own legal regime should not be deﬁ ned too narrowly in separating it from 
the rest of the world.
In the interwar period, Lévy-Ullmann (1922) was the ﬁ rst to divide laws, acknowledged 
as civilised, along the lines of their respective development8–
Continental
[written law,
with parliaments & 
codiﬁ cation
in the background]
English-speaking
[customary law,
developing through 
legal practice]
Muslim
[on a religious basis &
with an almost absolute 
immobility]
–with a conciseness that may increase posterity’s suspicion that he (like so many before and 
after him) actually made the only distinction between his home arrangement, accepted in 
the natural course as serving as a starting point, on the one hand, and everything else 
separated from the former, on the other. Or, he proceeded as if for him anything else could 
be nothing but embellishment, decoration or ﬂ ourish, with the sheer aim of aesthetic 
completeness. – From the vast three volumes of the historico-comparative tableau Wigmore 
(1928)9 drew for the American legal profession, one simply cannot ascertain whether or not 
the author indeed wished to classify or simply alluded to items by exempliﬁ cation, when in 
an all-inclusive overview–
Egyptian Mesopotamian Hebrew Chinese Hindu
Greek Roman Japanese Muslim Celtic
Slavic
(Czech, Polish, Yugoslavian, 
Russian)
German marine
Papal Romanesque Anglican
–he presented the huge variety of past and contemporary legal systems.
8 Lévy-Ullmann, H.: Observations générales sur les communications relatives au droit privé dans 
les pays étrangers. In: Les transformations du droit dans les principaux pays depuis cinquante ans 
(1869–1919). [Livre du cinquantenaire de la Société de législation comparée], Paris, 1922, 85–87.
9 Wigmore, J. H.: A Panorama of the World’s Legal Systems I–III. Chicago–Saint Paul, 1928.
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Finally, Martínez Paz (1934) took alleged genetic roots (with a quite telling progressive 
gradation) as the basis for his division10–
barbarian 
customary
(English, Swedish, 
Norwegian)
barbarian-
Romanist
(German, 
Italian, 
Austrian)
barbarian-
Romanist-canonic
(Spanish, 
Portuguese)
Romanist-canonic-
democratic
(Swiss, Latin 
American, Russian)
–in a European developmental perspective, while any other arrangement remained simply 
unnamed.
In the historical sequence of classiﬁ cations, the categorisation of Anglo-Saxon and 
Nordic developments as members of a single group emerges as a recurrent feature, while 
the separation of Latinic–German Central Europe from Western Europe proper within the 
Romanist coverage is a novel recognition.
The series of classiﬁ cations produced during the half-century following World War II 
was opened by a magniﬁ cent theoretical conspectus, authored by a triad in France. As is 
well known, the primary aim of Arminjon, Nolde and Wolff (1950) was to lay the theoretical-
methodological foundations of legal comparatism rather than to accomplish any description 
of the extent of the legal world. Accordingly, these authors excelled in elaborating private 
law as a group with criteria of categorisation given in a most promising manner. As an 
unavoidable by-product, however, they disregarded ideals of order (e.g. of the Far East) 
where any conceptualisation was abhorred. Eventually, they saw the historical evolution of 
private law in Europe as stemming from, and represented by, seven independent types. All 
in all, their classiﬁ cation11–
French German Scandinavian English Russian
Islamic Hindu
–has (with its separation of the Nordic region12) remained an exceptionally mature 
accomplishment for a long time.
David (1950), whose work in due course became the number one classic of the 
international comparative law movement, paved a somewhat different road. Although 
starting, too, with a dedication to civil law, he extended his research interests from the civil 
law technical instrumentality to entire legal arrangements as unities organised into a system, 
with various components gaining speciﬁ c roles. In parallel with the rise of the Iron Curtain 
between East and West in Europe and the threat of nuclear devastation with the increased 
sense of danger through the menace of a Third World War, the ideology or philosophical 
10 Martínez Paz, E.: Introducción al estudio del derecho civil comparado. Córdoba, 1934, 154 
et seq.
11 Arminjon, P.–Nolde, B.–Wolff, M.: Traité de droit comparé I. Paris, 1950, 49.
12 “Regarding its origins and development, the Scandinavian law is neither Roman, nor French, 
nor German.” Ibid. 50.
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worldview underlying the given legal regime became his primary concern for classiﬁ cation, 
only to be seconded with the technique of law in supplementation.13 His proposition–
Western
• French
• Anglo–American
[based on the moral rules 
of Christianity, the 
political & social 
principles of liberal 
democracy & the 
economic order of 
capitalism]
Soviet
[based on the 
Socialist 
economy & 
related 
political, 
social & 
moral 
principles]
Muslim
[on a 
religious 
basis]
Hindu
[on a speciﬁ c 
philosophical 
basis]
Chinese
–has exerted a long-standing inﬂ uence through the basic polarisation implied, despite its 
elementary simplicity in structure. Or, it constituted a plain reﬂ ection of the Cold War 
ideology raging at the time, whose basics were deﬁ ned by the opposition of the Western 
European and Atlantic world to the Third Rome, the Muscovite Empire. And again, as 
already seen elsewhere, the occasional reference to one or two remote cultures from faraway 
peripheries (which were starting to loom on the horizon) could only serve as sheer 
complementation. David’s subsequent analysis (1961) did in fact alleviate the harshness of 
this categorical opposition. Following its own path–he admitted–the West might also be 
inclined to move towards Socialism; moreover, even Africa and Asia (without Christianity 
in their past) might commit themselves to the same direction.14 Ironically enough, the 
deadly menace by the Soviet superpower (accompanied by the West’s growing slump into 
the pragmatism of realpolitik, having relinquished Hungary in the dramatic days of 1956) 
made Soviet ambitions respected worldwide, compelling the West to cowardly submission. 
Finally, the very cause of Socialism as a method of building a global system could obtain 
worldwide acknowledgment by granting its own typological locus to itself, while the Soviet 
terminology renamed its counter-pole, the “Western” law, as “bourgeois” one.
It is by no mere chance, therefore, that Sola Cañizares (1954) would propose a version 
resulting in minor corrections while exhibiting extreme simpliﬁ cation15–
13 David, R.: Traité élémentaire de droit civil comparé. Introduction à l’étude des droits 
étrangers et à la méthode comparative. Paris, 1950, 8, 214–226.
14 “By the way, the nations of the West are to different extents all committed to the road of 
socialism, moreover, I think they can make much progress on this way without having to renounce 
belonging to the system of Western law at the same time. After all, a number of non-Christian 
countries of Africa and Asia could adhere to the system of Western law without adherence to the 
principles of Christian morality.” David, R.: Existe-t-il un droit occidental? In: Nadelmann, K. H.–von 
Mehren, A. T.–Hazard, J. N. (eds): XXth Century Comparative and Conﬂ icts Law. Legal Essays in 
Honor of Hessel E. Yntema. Leyden, 1961, 59.
15 de Sola Cañizares, F.: Iniciación al derecho comparado. Barcelona, 1954, quoted by Rodière, 
R.: Introduction au droit comparé. Strasbourg, 1963, 13.
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Western
[Christian but
not authoritative]
Soviet
[atheist & 
collectivist]
religious
• derived from religious 
principles
(canonic, Hindu, Muslim)
• Chinese
[with a pseudo-religious 
philosophy in which the 
law is ethically coloured]
–, almost reminiscent of the tripartite vision by Lévy-Ullmann during the earlier peace time 
in 1922.
It is by no mere chance, either, that the Romanist sociologist Lévy-Bruhl (1961) would 
come forward, with an outsider’s ambitions, to propose a new theoretical scheme–
Western Soviet Theocratic
• ancient Jewish
• Muslim
feudal primitive
–, applying his typological model in order to outline a legal sociological panorama with a 
historical approach in the background.16 Albeit being otherwise conservative as permeated 
by respect for traditional values, this typology may astonish us by presenting both the West 
and the anti-West, i.e. Bolshevism, with equal taxonomic weight, moreover, in a way mixed 
sublimely with arrangements originated in world religions that had in their time set our 
civilisational path for millennia. However, assessing the atmosphere of cosmic threats with 
expectations of a coming cataclysm, such western submissiveness still needs to be explained 
in terms of social psychology rather than in cool detachment with some apparent 
objectivity.
Yet, in the meantime the world opened itself up to the Western mind, and theoretically 
inspired attempts at a philosophical classiﬁ cation emerged. In a classical manner, Northrop’s 
typiﬁ cation (1959)17–based on an understanding of the speciﬁ cally Far Eastern–discerned 
the following groups:
“intuitive mediational”
(CONFUCian, Buddhist, 
Taoist,
non-Aryan Hindu)
accorded to natural history
(classic China, MANU,
ancient Indian Aryan 
conquerors, Islamic law codes,
those preceding the Stoic 
Roman law)
abstract contractual
–, in terms of which, in the Far Eastern arrangement denominated as intuitive mediational,
16 Lévy-Bruhl, H.: Sociologie du droit. Paris, 1961, 116.
17 Northrop, F. S. C.: The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience. Studies in the Methods 
of Normative Subjects. Boston, 1959, 184.
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“[t]he procedure […] is to push legal codes into the background, preferably dispensing 
with them altogether, and to bring the disputants into a warm give-and-take relationship, 
usually by way of a mediator, so that previously made demands can be modiﬁ ed 
gracefully, and a unique solution taking all the exceptional circumstances of the case 
into account is spontaneously accepted by both disputants. Codes there may be, but 
they are to be used only as a last resort, and even then recourse to them brings shame 
upon the disputants. […] Not only is there no resort to a legal rule; there is also no 
judge. Even the mediator refuses to give a decision. Instead, the dispute is properly 
settled when the disputants, using the mediator merely as an emissary, come to mutual 
agreement in the light of all the existential circumstances, past, present, and future. 
[…] Not the abstract universals of a legal code, but the existential particularity of the 
concrete problematic situation […] is the criterion of the just and the good.”18
By contrast, in an arrangement developed in accordance with natural history in a naive 
realistic way–
“Its codes […] are expressed in the syntactical grammar of the language of common-
sense objects and relations […;] the codes describe the biologically conceived 
patriarchal or matriarchal familial and tribal kinship norms of the inductively and 
sensuously given status quo.”
–, realistic universals are applied.19 Finally, in a law according to an abstract contractual 
ideal, there is some
“technical terminology […] permitting the construction of legal and social entities and 
relations […while...] its identiﬁ cation of the ethical and the socially legal with 
abstractly and imaginatively constructed […] human norms and relations […] makes 
possible ethical and legal reform.” Because “[b]efore this code all men are equal; they 
are instances of the same universals; their existential particularity is ethically 
irrelevant.” “Thereby [...] a contractually constructed norm cannot be regarded as 
ethical unless if it holds for any one individual it also holds for any other.”20
At just about the same time a new upswing occurred also, due to reform initiatives 
addressed at classical comparative law. Schnitzer, as the pioneering ﬁ rst, claimed 
(1961)21–after having revised his earlier suggestion (1945)22–that there were ﬁ ve great 
blocks of civilisation–
18 Ibid. 184–185. As he remarks on 186, all this is akin to the radical empiricism and nominalism 
of Dewey, Kierkegaard, and Sartre as well, as “behind this intuitive, mediational type of law in Asia 
there is a Confucian, Buddhist and pre-Aryan Hindu epistemology which afﬁ rms that full, direct and 
exact empirical knowledge of any individual, relation or event in nature reveals it to be unique”.
19 Ibid. 186.
20 Ibid. 188, 188, 189.
21 Schnitzer, A. F.: Vergleichende Rechtslehre I. 2. auﬂ ., Basel, 1961, 133. et seq.
22 Schnitzer, A. F.: Vergleichende Rechtslehre. Basel, 1945, 86 et seq.
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primitive 
peoples
antique cultural 
peoples
(Egypt,
Mesopotamia,
Hellas, Rome)
European–
American
• Romanist
• Germanic
• Slavic
• Anglo–
American
religious
• Jewish
• Christian
• Islamic
Afro–Asian
• Asian
• African
–, within which each and every “great cultural circle” [große Kulturkreise] could generate a 
corresponding “circle of law” [Rechtskreis]. Accordingly, the respective cultures are to be 
separated historically in a way that encompasses the whole of legal development. Probably 
only this can explain, why the Nordic region was not differentiated within a Euro–Atlantic 
civilisation taken as a coherent block. 
It is remarkable that the classiﬁ cation by Zweigert, published about the same time 
(1961), concentrating on the present when distinguishing variations in the middle-term of 
“circles of law”,23 repeated almost word for word the scheme once formulated by Arminjon, 
Nolde and Wolff in 1950, while exclusively adding the Far-Eastern variant to it.24 His 
division–
Romanist German Nordic Anglo-Saxon Communist
Eastern (non-Communist) Islamic Hindu
–is not only conclusive but also justiﬁ ed, in as much as he clariﬁ es his pre-suppositions. 
Avoiding unifactorality (but presuming that differing results will ensue depending on 
whether public law or private law has been taken into consideration), the style of the overall 
legal system is selected as the basis of classiﬁ cation, which is a compound of its (1) 
historical origin and (2) characteristic mode of thinking, as well as of its (3) legal institutions 
(especially in case of developed Western law) and (4) sources of law, taken together with 
their interpretation (especially in case of Islamic and Hindu laws), and, ﬁ nally, also of the 
(5) ideological attributes underlying the ideal of the respective legal order (especially in 
case of laws with religious background or Socialist roots).25
As already remarked once, the Socialist (or, in its original inspiration, the Soviet) law 
appeared as a separate type in the work of DAVID, the ﬁ rst author of the Cold War, as early 
as in 1950, and remained a recurrent component until the fall of the Socialist world system.
Moreover, the term would also be utilised–in addition to instances of over-ideologisation 
or over-politicisation–through theoretical generalisation. For example, Kulcsár (1961)26 
would suggest a dichotomic division from the outset–
23 Zweigert, K.: Zur Lehre von den Rechtskreisen. In: XXth Century Comparative and Conﬂ icts 
Law. op. cit. 48–54.
24 Ibid. 55.
25 Zweigert, K.–Kötz, H.: Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiete des 
Privatrechts I. Tübingen, 1971, 69, 74.
26 Kulcsár, K.: A jog nevelő szerepe a szocialista társadalomban [The educative role of law in a 
socialist society]. Budapest, 1961, 9–12.
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exploitative
[protection of the status quo,
affecting external behaviour only 
by setting limits to it]
Socialist
[also building a new society
with targeted education 
transforming the whole man]
–, which would consolidate as precisely an expression of timely need.27
Even if from some opposite starting point–based not on the futurism of forming man 
according to Socialist utopianism, but on exactly that which Socialism denies from the 
Western achievements of several millennia of civilisational development–, Western thinkers 
arrived at a similar result in a typological sense. Thus, according to the Indian Bose (1962), 
the only criterion of division cannot be but the nature and degree of “adherence to the rule 
of law”.28 Accordingly, there are two opposing poles and various transitions distinguished–
Western
[so solid that
no change
in foundations
is conceivable]
transitions
• West-related
(India, Malaysia, Jordan, partly Africa)
• partial
(Burma, Pakistan, Turkey)
• dictatorship behind a mere legal façade
(Indonesia, Guinea)
• total chaos
(Congo)
Communist
–, in which the dynamism of the intermediate sphere (with the value-orientation of the 
tendencies of development that may forecast recent directions) seems to be the most 
progressive element.
Gorla (1963) substantiated the world’s division into two, taken as the hegemony of 
one deﬁ nite standard expected to be a force capable of suppressing anything else, while 
introducing in his typological foundation the concept that the opposition between the 
capitalist and the Socialist law overwhelms the one between the Civil Law and the Common 
Law. As he explicates by a lucid distinction–
27 As a doubtlessly number one authority, Szabó remarks that “it is the discrepancy of 
characteristics that prevails over formal similarities” see Szabó, I.: Ellentmondások a különböző 
társadalmi rendszerek joga között [Contradictions between the laws belonging to different social 
systems]. Állam- és Jogtudomány, 6 (1963) 2, 160 {also see Szabó, I.: Des contradictions entre le 
droit des différents systèmes sociaux. Dialectica (Revue internationale de philosophie de la 
Connaissance), 18 (1964), 351–371}–, therefore “there is no basis for legal comparison between the 
two types of law that would theoretically »stand beyond« this extent of class determination”–and 
Szabó, I.: Az összehasonlító jogtudomány. In: Szabó, I. (ed.): Kritikai tanulmányok a modern polgári 
jogelméletről [Critical studies about modern western legal theory]. Budapest, 1963, 72 {also as La 
science comparative du droitm. Annales Universitatis Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae 
Sectio juridical, 5 (1964), 91–134}.
28 Bose, V.: Legal Education as a Basis for the Rule of Law in Africa and Eastern Countries. 
Columbia University Law Alumni Bulletin, 7 (1962) 2.
263TAXONOMY OF LAW AND LEGAL MAPPING
formal difference difference of substance
Continental Anglo-Saxon Socialist
–, “The difference between »continental (or Romanist) law« and »common law« is certainly 
rather formal, i.e. drawn by a criterion that distinguishes and approaches forms (structures, 
techniques and concepts), rather than »substance«.”29
The debate addressing the issue for a quarter of a century as to how much the distinctive 
features are expected to stem from a common basis and their ideological background–in 
addition to the separation of the distinctive ones from within a single entity–compelled the 
French master of post-war legal comparatism to change his stand deﬁ nitely. Having left 
behind the community of ethos indicated by the category of “Western law”, David then 
proposed (1964) the introduction of two mutually supplementing criteria, namely “legal 
technique” (including vocabulary, concepts, hierarchy of the sources of law and juridical 
methods) as well as “philosophical, political or economic principles desired to be 
implemented”–only providing that “[t]he two criteria are to be used subsequently and not in 
isolation.”30 Accordingly, he re-formulated his taxonomy, using the middle term of “legal 
family” [famille de droit] in the following way:
Romanist–
German
Socialist
• Soviet
• peoples’ 
democracies
Anglo-Saxon
• English
• USA
religious or traditional
• Muslim
• Indian
• Far-Eastern
(Chinese, Japanese)
• African & Madagascan
Albeit this separates what is obviously distinct from within the diverse formations (or 
Soviet deformations) of Western civilisation, yet in a scholarly indefensible manner it 
relegates everything non-Western into one single and improperly deﬁ ned notional category. 
For indeed, any reference to “philosophical, religious or traditional”31 laws is hardly more 
in the ﬁ nal analysis than a mere pretext for separating what is “other” or “different”. 
Following such logic, any comparatist–from the Far East via the Muslims to the Malagasy 
and Hova tribes in Madagascar–might arrange a cliché to group Berlin, Paris, Rome, 
London and New York into the same category of esoterica alongside with Moscow and 
Tirana.
So it is not by chance that critical self-reﬂ ection had to continue. For instance, Rodière 
(1963) responded to the challenge by narrowing the circle of legal regimes to be classiﬁ ed. 
29 Gorla, G.: Intérêts et problèmes de la comparaison entre le droit continental et la Common 
Law. Revue internationale de Droit comparé, 15 (1963) 1, 9.
30 David, R.: Les grands systèmes de Droit contemporains. Paris, 1964, 16.
31 David is also inconsequent in that his Table of contents indicates “droits religieux et 
traditionnels”, while the text relates to “systèmes philosophiques ou religieux” (ibid. 23.), albeit some 
justiﬁ cation will follow in his presentation, for “These systems, quite independent from each other, 
are not to qualify as genuine families. [...] Even the claim whether they are to mean law at all can be 
doubted.” Ibid.
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He opined that as to the prospects of foreseeable future harmonisation, there is no common 
basis of comparison beyond the reach of Christianity.32 Accordingly, only a threefold 
partition–with the types of
French Anglo-Saxon Soviet
–is suitable for comparison. Moreover, he even remarked that regarding terminology, it is 
French and Soviet laws, and regarding principles, French and Anglo-Saxon laws, that are 
genuinely comparable to one another. And he added: Soviet law seems to harmonise with 
western continental law in formal tradition with well-developed solutions and techniques 
deﬁ ning a common direction; Anglo-Saxon law differs from the French one solely by its 
speciﬁ ed techniques; and the Soviet law sharply separates from the French and the Anglo-
Saxon ones mostly by their guiding principles.33
Following this line of thought, grouping in terms of the variations of a deﬁ nite 
correlation amongst the above elements had by then become the standard pattern. The 
classiﬁ cation put forward by Malmström (1969), based principally upon historical 
characteristics with varying subdivisions34–
Western
(European–American)
• continental
• Latin American
• Nordic
• Anglo-Saxon
Socialist
(Communist)
• Soviet
• peoples’ 
democracies
• Chinese
Asian
(non-
Communist)
African
• Anglophone
• Francophone
–proposed the most enlarged version since David’s early attempt in 1950, as the very ﬁ rst to 
grant the laws of Latin America a named status, while he grouped distinct civilisations 
under one bland collective notion to typify regimes in Africa that have managed to survive 
as faint copies of their English or French colonisers’ law. The other variation produced at 
that time was the typology improved by Zweigert–Kötz (1971)35–
Romanist German Anglo–American Nordic Socialist
Far Eastern Islamic Hindu
32 Rodière: Introduction... op. cit. 26–27.
33 Ibid. 14–16.
34 Malmström, A.: The System of Legal Systems: Notes on a Problem of Classiﬁ cation in 
Comparative Law. Scandinavian Studies in Law, 13 (1969), 127–149.
35 Zweigert, K.–Kötz, H.: Introduction to Comparative, Law I. (trans. Weir, T.) Oxford, 1987. 
The ﬁ rst edition in German in 1971 (note 25, 74.) still emphasised that “Common historical sources 
which exist at the beginning of the evolution, lose their importance with regard to the »style« of the 
legal systems when later events exert a more determining inﬂ uence on them”. A sharp and justiﬁ ed 
criticism of such a separation of Romanist and Germanic arrangements up to their roots is provided 
by Zajtay, I.: Reﬂ ections on the Problem of Grouping the Families of Law [1973] in his Beiträge zur 
Rechtsvergleichung. Ausgewählte Schriften (hrsg.: Kreuzer, K. F.). Tübingen, 1976, 70–73.
265TAXONOMY OF LAW AND LEGAL MAPPING
–, which in fact is a version of the proposition by Zweigert in 1961, scarcely modiﬁ ed but 
expressly worsened, as the Scandinavian law, put in-between the Anglo–American and the 
Socialist arrangements, is deﬁ nitely cut from both its Romanist and Germanic roots.36
The proliferation within a few decades of attempts bearing the marks of fashion may 
have discredited the undertaking itself and the merits of the whole enterprise; at least no 
new proposal could be heard about during the subsequent quarter of a century. Eörsi’s 
distinction with sensitivity to civil law (1973)37 represented again a Marxist historical 
perspective, while adding to Kulcsár’s typology (“exploitative / Socialist”) framed a decade 
ago–
natural 
communities
capitalist
• English & Nordic
• French
• Germanic
• Central & Southeast-
European
Socialist
–, and excelling by the presentation of Anglo–American and Scandinavian laws in one 
common category as well as by the very naming of the Central and Southeast-European 
region.
The other comparatist endeavours at the time mostly contributed to the clariﬁ cation of 
the fact that Common Law is a genuinely faithful heir of the richness of Roman law, 
nurturing exactly both from, and further on, its roots. (Ironically enough, this realisation 
coincided with the gradual relocation of the scholarly cultivation of Roman law from its 
one-time exclusivity in the Latin–Germanic region of Middle Europe to the English-
speaking areas, calling for common law mentality as local sensitivity.) Accordingly, 
Schlesinger (1960) pointed out that “in spirit and method, and also in many particulars, 
classical Roman law is closer to the Common Law than to the modern civilian codes.” Or,
“in a common law system the case law, made binding by the doctrine of stare decisis, 
represents an element of stability, and [...] change is brought about mainly by statutory 
law. […] In the civil law, on the other hand, the codes provide some certainty (at least 
verbal certainty) and structural stability, while judicial »interpretation«, unfettered by a 
formal rule of stare decisis, constitutes an element of ﬂ exibility.”38
36 It is not by chance that the British critic sees in such a grouping more of chaos than of 
systemic taxonomy. See Twining, W.: Globalization and Comparative Law. Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law, 6 (1999) 3, 232.
37 Eörsi, Gy.: On the Problem of the Division of Legal Systems. In: Rotondi, M. (ed.): Inchieste 
di diritto comparator II. Padova–New York, 1973, 196.
38 Schlesinger, R. B.: Comparative Law. Cases–Text–Materials. 2nd ed., London, 1960, 174, 
187, note 2. Even if striking by its lucidity, probably all this is by far not new. Rabel, E. asserted as 
early as sixty-ﬁ ve years ago–Schriften aus dem Nachlaß: Vorträge – Unprinted Lectures. Rabels 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, 50 (1986) 1–2, 322–323–that
“English and Roman […] analogies in their policies of building an empire, and also in basic 
qualities of their legal habits. Customary law is paramount; the case law method, progress from case 
decision to case decision, prevails; a cautious tradition forms crude beginnings into reﬁ ned justice, 
supported by the dualism of customary strict law and equitable practice of magistrates–jus civile and 
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In the last decade of the second millennium, some faint attempts at providing at least 
some didactic indication amongst altered conditions eventually re-emerged. The Czech 
Knapp was among the ﬁ rst to dispense with Socialism (1991) and to acknowledge Western 
law had survived in its old dual form after the collapse of the Soviet empire–
continental Anglo–American Islamic
–, remarking that Civil Law and Common Law, in company with the Islamic legal culture, 
are now the global systems developed enough to be worthy of dedicated jurisprudential 
analysis.39 – At Lund, Bogdan (1994) was even more cautious and pragmatic, as if 
pondering: why talk about more than is worthy of introduction at a certain depth anyway? 
His speciﬁ cation and treatment in a Swedish textbook–
English American French German Socialist
Chinese Islamic
–did not waste space with Nordic generalisation but saw Socialist law surviving in 
peripheries, and even proposed Chinese law for analysis.40
Conceptions following in time were scarcely more than variations on traditions brought 
about by predecessors. Thus, for example, Van Hoecke and Warrington (1998) openly re-
proposed the scheme dividing “us” from “others”41–
Western other
• Asian • Islamic • African
praetorium, common law and equity–and the entire doctrine is devoted to the question of what action 
or defense a party has in court; whereas we now ask with Justinian: what is a party’s right without 
any litigation?”
This is a basic truth according to which “The common law establishes its general principles by 
considering how a reasonable man would act in particular circumstances while the natural law method 
is to state general principles and then to assume that the reasonable man would act in accordance with 
them.” Goodhart, A. L.: English Contributions to the Philosophy of Law. New York, 1949, 35.
It is to be noted how much the characterisation building on the Anglo–American reconstruction 
of the Roman legal tradition is more sophisticated and alive, compared to continental approaches 
exhausted by inductivity contrasted to deductivity. For instance, Pound’s opinion that the “essential 
difference between the civil law and the common law is one not of substance but of method” was not 
interpreted simplistically by Lawson, F. H.: A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law. Ann Arbor 
(MI), 1953, 46 (whereas “a code is not a necessary mark of a civil law system nor the absence of one 
a mark of a common law system”) but all this is to signify a difference in the “type of mind”, meaning 
that “a civil law system is favorable to codiﬁ cation”, a circumstance “more important than codes” 
themselves.
39 Knapp, V.: Základy srovnávací právní vědy [Outlines of comparative jurisprudence]. Praha, 
1991, 52–53, 58.
40 Bogdan, M.: Comparative Law. Stockholm, 1994.
41 van Hoecke, M.–Warrington, M.: Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Dogmatics: 
Towards a New Model for Comparative Law. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 47 
(1998) 3, 495–536.
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–, linking (without any originality of thought as simply identiﬁ ed by geographical areas) 
immensely diverse, vast cultures that have nothing in common beyond merely being “non-
Western”, with the rest of human culture simply amalgamated. – Glenn’s grouping (2000)42 
also met a call for practicality –
chtonic Talmudic of civil law Islamic
common law Hindu Asian
–with the additional feature that, by referring to genuine traditions, (a) he intended to 
separate philosophically clearly identiﬁ able historical patterns of thought, within the 
framework of which (b) he started with the chthonic (i.e. ancient, primitive, organic [chthōn 
= earth]) model of order, notwithstanding the fact that hardly any institutional law could 
have developed within it.
Approaching the new millennium, typological experiments re-appeared in a renewed 
guise that associated the dedication of legal mapping with the present, while including 
historical developmental overviews. At the same time, they enriched the static reﬂ ection of 
the past or present with an indication of the formation’s dynamic motion from somewhere 
to somewhere. All this may have been motivated by the realisation that everything 
momentarily prevailing can only be interpreted as the section given at a single moment of 
ceaseless formation. At the same time, there is a practical need to ﬁ nd comprehensively 
substantive categories expressing the directions and limits of globalising legal effects, both 
actual and potential. For instance, Mattei, the Italian comparatist active in the United States, 
made a proposition (1997) to amalgamate politics, law, and philosophical and religious 
tradition in one scheme of classiﬁ cation,43 suitable to provoke passionate debates. In the 
ﬁ nal analysis, this scheme–
professional law
(Western legal tradition)
[separation of legal & 
political decision 
making, secularisation 
of law]
• British & American
• Roman & Germanic
• Nordic
• mixed
political law
(law of development)
[unstable]
(ex-Socialist,
Southeast European,
Cuban,
unestablished African
& South American)
traditional law
(oriental view)
• Islamic
• Indian and Hindu
• other Asian / CONFUCian
(Chinese {diverging
towards the political}
& Japanese {developing towards 
the professional},1 post-Soviet-
Asian, ex-Socialist Asian)
42 Glenn, H. P.: Legal Traditions of the World. Sustainable Diversity in Law. Oxford, 2000. Cf. 
also Varga, Cs.: Comparative Legal Cultures? Renewal by Transforming into a Genuine Discipline. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica, 48 (2007) 2, 95–113 {and <http://www.akademiai.com/content/
gk485p7w8q5652x3/fulltext.pdf>}.
43 Mattei, U.: Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems. The 
American Journal of Comparative Law, 45 (1997) 1, 19.
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–contrasted the West to the East, that is, the law of secular autonomous professionalism to 
the law of traditionalism, rigidiﬁ ed in its past, both standing for permanence and stability as 
benchmarks of conceivable alignment, only in order to insert in-between that which is in 
ﬂ ux, which is instable and dependent, dominated by mere politics, yet able to evolve in 
either of the above directions. In addition, Mattei did not even consider his scheme as a 
system of commensurable subjects but rather as a viewpoint or a recommendable notional 
approach for possible grouping. This is so because its components are seen to be in constant 
movement, as subjects that are not homogeneous entities but sets strained by inner conﬂ icts, 
bound to diverge in various directions. For
“[t]he same system may belong to the rule of traditional law if we consider family law, 
while belonging to the rule of professional law as far as commercial law is concerned, 
and to the rule of political law when we look at its criminal justice system.”44
In the ethos and drift of debates induced by Mattei, the Finnish Husa (2004) presented 
the available conﬁ gurations in a cross-referential frame. His grouping of a double 
division45–
Strengthening/established Weakening/unestablished
Western • civil law
• common law
• Socialist
non-Western • Islamic
• Hindu
• African
• Asian
Mixed (Israeli, of Québec) (Scottish, Louisianan)
–polarised about the centrifugality of becoming established and the centripetality of being 
unestablished, and the substantiation through Western and non-Western models or impacts, 
at the same time. It treated Socialism as a transitional phase from the outset, an inherent 
product of the West, for “socialist law is culturally a European innovation […] of European 
Marxism”, independently whether taken as generation or degeneration.46 As to the Eastern 
tradition, only the Muslim and Hindu laws were speciﬁ ed as sufﬁ ciently established and 
worthy of analysis. Or, Korean, Chinese and/or Japanese Confucianism were portrayed as 
weakening and vanishing in law, therefore relegateable to a category with the uncertainties 
of Africa, and as left without doctrinal analysis. Finally, in his mixed category it is 
reassuringly realistic to encounter Scottish law as foreseen to change (certainly reviving 
again its Roman roots), Louisiana (presumably weakening in resistance to Americanisation), 
and Israel (as settled in multiculturality).
44 Ibid. 16.
45 Husa, J.: Classiﬁ cation of Legal Families Today: Is It Time for a Memorial Hymn? Revue 
internationale de Droit comparé, 56 (2004) 1, 11–38.
46 Ibid. 30.
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3. Impossible Taxonomy, or the Moment of Practicality in Legal Mapping
While in theoretical legal thinking one may notice the progressive historical accumulation 
of philosophical-methodological foundations, legal comparatism needs, apparently as part 
of each step, to be restarted anew, although a major part of its literature has ever been 
engaged in resolving the riddle of what comparison may mean at all in law.
The expressive simile that the laws’ classiﬁ cation still “ﬁ nds itself in the condition of 
botany and zoology before Linnaeus and of anatomy before Cuvier”47 highlights the 
unsettled nature of the preliminary issues of legal mapping. For natural objects exist as 
evolved timelessly and autonomously, with underlying structures forming the principle of 
sensible separation, describable by some physicality. In contrast, legal systems are 
historically forming objectivations. They evolve in various communities belonging to 
separate civilisations, contextualised by various cultural media, scarcely featuring anything 
in common. Their common denominator (or genus proximum) can only be the need for, and 
organisational force of, abstracting human conceptualisation on the social ideal of ordo. Or, 
from the variety of ways in which human organisations can be arranged with the help of 
various (religious, ethical, economic and political) means, that which our conventionality 
calls ‘law’ or phenomena ‘embodying the law’ will be selected–as differentia speciﬁ ca–from 
the realisation that (a) the law is a global phenomenon by embracing the whole of society 
when (b) it settles (resolves) society’s basic conﬂ icts of interests (c) in its quality of serving 
as society’s ﬁ nal regulatory and controlling force.48 Consequently, being a heterogeneous 
set resisting any taxonomy, it is exclusively the practical human need that may, if at all, 
force it to be classiﬁ ed, in order that minor groups of components can be characterised as 
some kind of unity. Therefore, stating that grouping “[f]or some comparatist […] may serve 
[…] a utility […] similar to […] taxonomies.”49 or that it is resorted to “above all, for 
taxonomic reasons”50 can at most be a ﬁ gurative expression. We get closer to a feasible 
answer by simply declaring that “classiﬁ cations are made for the purpose of simpliﬁ cation”,51 
that is, that conglomerations will be dissected into minor units with the view of rendering 
their heterogeneous components more manageable in practice.
Literature is clear in realising that “it is impossible to establish a uniform system of 
classiﬁ cation which is ideal from every point of view and implies a clear distinction between 
»families« or groups”.52 In conclusion, it is not our knowledge, or initiation into scholarship, 
that is insufﬁ cient–even if this was the case before Carolus Linnaeus or Georges Cuvier, or 
(in describing the set of elementary material components) Dmitri Ivanovich Mendeleev. 
What is at stake here is the brutal fact that our object can only be seen as a section of 
incidental sets, emerged from incidental processes with incidental components, that may, its 
being in constant formation notwithstanding, yet be projected notionally as a ﬁ xed block, 
47 Constantinesco, L.-J.: Traité de droit comparé 3. La science des droits comparés. Paris, 1983, 
21, note 5.
48 For further explication, see Varga, Cs.: The Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999, 
para. 6.1, 204.
49 Husa, J.: Legal Families in Comparative Law–are they of any Real Use? Rettfærd 
[Copenhagen], 24 (2001), 95, 18.
50 Zweigert–Kötz: Introduction to Comparative Law… op. cit. 63.
51 Örücü, E.: Mixed and Mixing Systems: A Conceptual Search. In: Örücü, E.–Attwooll, E.–
Coyle, S. (eds): Studies in Legal Systems. Mixed and Mixing. The Hague, 1996, 335.
52 Malmström: The System... op. cit. 138.
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stable enough to be subjected to systematic investigation without, however, any self-closing 
theory being justiﬁ ed.
Whether the notional designation of a historical epoch, an artistic style, a group of 
legal systems or the implementation of any other artiﬁ cial human ordering principle is at 
issue, this can only be the middle category of some comprehensive socio-cultural description, 
which is most suited for characterisation rather than for deﬁ nition.53 Any such notional 
designation is the conventionalised issue of classifying objects, a generation of human 
culture to project some sensible order. As to such designations, the dilemma whether they 
represent a real or an ideal type is not to be resolved by them. Likewise, it is not a sine qua 
non characteristic whether or not they have a reference in reality. In the sense of 
epistemological reﬂ ection (or correspondence), they are not necessarily either true or false, 
nor need they be without alternatives. Instead, they are suitable for purposes of 
comprehensive typological characterisation, thanks to the classiﬁ cation performed. Any 
such description is open-ending as “there can never be any ﬁ nal proof of what is »important« 
or »essential«”54 in a grouping. Therefore, the obvious fact that all such operations “are 
generally embedded in local cultural and social systems, and serve various social functions”55 
is neither an auxiliary feature nor mere historical coincidence but the expression of their 
plain practicality.
Even though categories like “cultural and legal circles” with varying “styles” may 
seem somewhat rudimentary,56 nevertheless all this embodies a decisive step departing from 
the false objectivity of rule fetishism57 to arrive at the law’s inner understanding as a 
basically cultural phenomenon. This is an elementary conjecture of the recognition of law 
as culture, culture of thought, of ordering, etc., to foster also, among others, an interest in 
the comparative judicial mind.58
In sum, in order to speak distinctively about past and present legal systems, as arranged 
in some groupings that may allow us to characterise their minor sets in a generalising way, 
53 For example Cassirer, E.: The Logic of the Humanities [Logik der Kulturwissenschaften]. 
(trans. Smith Howe, C.) New Haven, 1961. 140 separates the culture-concepts from the nature-
concepts with reference to the pioneering groundwork of Wölfﬂ in, H.: Kunstgeschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe. Das Problem der Stilenentwicklung in der neueren Kunst. München, 1915 {Principles 
of Art History. The Problem of the Development of Style in Later Art. (trans. Hottinger, E. D.) New 
York, 1950}, by stating that the former “characterize but [...] not determine; for the particulars which 
they comprehend cannot be deduced from them.” The same conclusion is reached in logic by 
distinguishing concepts of order (suited for characterisation exclusively) from class-concepts (which 
deﬁ ne inclusion in a conceptual extent), by Hempel, C. G.–Oppenheim, P.: Der Typusbegriff im Licht 
der neuen Logik. Leiden, 1936.
54 Spiethoff, A.: Die Allgemeine Volkswirtschaftslehre als geschichtliche Theorie. In: Spiethoff, 
A. (hrsg.): Festgabe für Werner Sombart zur siebenzigsten Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages 19. Jänner 
1933. München, 1933, 57. quoted by Zweigert–Kötz: Introduction... op. cit. 69.
55 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxonomy>.
56 Cf., e.g. by Constantinesco, L.-J.: Die Kulturkreise als Grundlage des Rechtskreise. Zeitschrift 
für Rechtsvergleichung, 22 (1981) 80, 161–178 and Über den Stil der »Stiltheorie« in der 
Rechtsvergleichung see Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, 78 (1979), 154 et seq.
57 This recognition as an intuition is hardly formulated expressly in comparatism yet. Even the 
harsh criticism by Hoecke–Warrington: Legal Cultures... op. cit. 502 stops at stating that “It is doubtful 
whether the traditional »law as rules« is able to offer sound basis for »legal family« classiﬁ cations”.
58 Cf., e.g. Varga, Cs. (ed.): Comparative Legal Cultures. Aldershot–New York, 1992, 331–447 
and Gessner, V.–Hoeland, A.–Varga, Cs. (eds): European Legal Cultures. Aldershot, 1996, 87–166.
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ﬁ rst we have to reckon what we are talking about at all. That is, we have to re-construct 
them within a typology set up for exactly such a purpose, that is, as subordinated to (quasi) 
class-concepts in a (quasi) logical form. This very form still will remain empty as, in want 
of any meta-culture suitable for derivation, there is no criterion or framework that could 
serve as a bridge between differing cultures. Consequently, the result of any classifying 
enterprise can only be some characterisation ﬂ uctuating in terms of more or less, in the 
course of which we commeasure independent phenomena by provoking them to respond to 
questions that are alien to their speciﬁ cs–even if making sense from some practical point of 
view. Or, the criticism as to the necessary deﬁ ciency of classiﬁ cation is in the ﬁ nal analysis 
nothing but self-criticism of the presuppositions generated by the Western Utopia of 
rationalism, ready to logify everything within its one principled perspective. Eventually it 
tells less about its subject than about ourselves: the predomination of our thought by 
logifying rationalism and natural-science-patterned theoretical epistemology.
This is one of the cases of enchantment in scholarship. For, in the ﬁ nal analysis, we all 
live with some “us”-consciousness59 and–using a double standard in classiﬁ cations–we put 
“Western legal culture at the top of some implicit normative scale”.60 By the same gesture, 
in fact, we deprive ourselves of the “critical potential”61 of any objective evaluation. 
Nevertheless, this very bias is not blameworthy. We are mapping legal systems precisely for 
the sake of perceiving them as contrasted to our familiar one, in the speciﬁ c characteristics 
and direction that distinguish them as differing from the one we are accustomed to. Frankly 
speaking, it is neither a critical distance proposed by the objectivity of scientiﬁ c description, 
nor an external observer’s position by which we approach such arrangements that we deem 
to be different. Quite to the contrary, we do so in order to cognise our own better, that is to 
say, to compare the latter with the former, upon the basis of our own culture. So we are 
neither neutral nor in want of sympathy but, contrariwise, we wish simply to cognise, for 
ourselves, on the basis of knowledge we have acquired so far. Consequently, in the 
meantime, in order to know the other, too, we have to act “against the natural tendency to 
use without reﬂ ection the ideals of one’s own system as the normative measure”.62
Considering the extent to which the Soviet/Socialist law could come into focus during 
the Cold War epoch through also predominating the efforts to group legal arrangements 
during that period,63 we can now regard it either as a historical accident or as a contingency 
of politico-scholarly considerations that almost no typology proposed that the laws of the 
Bolshevism, Fascism and National Socialism be recognised between the two World Wars, 
notwithstanding the fact that their expansion was spectacular, and their self-identity, 
rejecting and surpassing the Roman ideal of law, combative and ﬁ rm. Maybe the torpidity 
59 Husa: Classiﬁ cation... op. cit. 17.
60 Frankenberg, G.: Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law. Harvard International 
Law Journal, 26 (1985) 2, 422.
61 Peters, A.–Schwenke, H.: Comparative Law Beyond Post-modernism. International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 49 (2000) 4, 821.
62 Reitz, J. C.: How to Do Comparative Law. The American Journal of Comparative Law, 46 
(1998) 4, 623.
63 Cf., as a Hungarian case study by Varga, Cs.: A szocializmus marxizmusának jogelmélete 
[Legal philosophy of the Marxism of socialism]. Világosság, 45 (2004) 4, para. 1.3.d., 96–97. A 
Hungarian overview: Institutionalisation accompanied by relaxation (from the 1960’s: Comparatism 
on the international scene, the legitimisation of socialist law as a sui generis type and, in Hungary, the 
professionalisation (in rehabilitation) of law taken as a separate scholarly subject.
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of comparatism’s classifying inclination and the alarm generated by the interwar Bolshevik/
Fascist/NationalSocialist experiments–or, in brief, realpolitik alone–can explain the 
selectivity in terms of which at given periods of time, certain phenomena may actually be 
ﬁ ltered through conceptual generalisation to become a general category of classiﬁ cation, 
while others may perhaps not. Therefore, in social matters, the reason why certain features 
become conceptualised does not lie necessarily and exclusively in se and per se but, in part 
at least, also in our desire to make them be classiﬁ ed.
4. Diversity as a Fundamental Quality of Human Existence
Extremities such as the dichotomisation separating “us” from “them” (standing for what is 
different) may easily lead to subjection by the prevailing mainstream, which frequently 
changes, by the way. The very threat of World War Two might have let the world’s diversity 
be seen as a potential danger itself, in which even the national particularisation of laws 
could seem irrational–
“the diversity of laws [...] is an obstacle to commerce and communications, created by 
misunderstandings of all kinds, which does not correspond to the economic and 
spiritual interdependence of the modern world”64
–, while we today, after the liberally rooted dogma of humankind’s unity and uniformity has 
broken up, easily tend to antagonise the different as enemy. As a result of this, even a 
simplifying conclusion drawn from the clash of civilisations65 may potentially expose the 
legal map’s variegation as foreshadowing some “clash of legal families”.66 True, such fears 
and aversions may have indeed been supported by the Western law’s rule-fetishism, forced 
to sense its own multiplication when it encountered the plurality of non-western laws.
However, once we recognise behind alienating reiﬁ cations the strength of culture in 
law, and in the law’s speciﬁ city the relative autonomy of how to ﬁ nd ways and paths to the 
order (re-)established,67 we may come closer to understanding why it is necessary that the 
world’s civilisational and cultural diversity be seen as a prerequisite of human existence, 
fundamental to survival.
64 Schnitzer, A. F.: De la diversité et de l’uniﬁ cation du droit. Aspects juridiques et sociologiques. 
Bâle, 1946, 1.
65 Huntington, S. P.: The Clash of Civilizations. Foreign Affairs, 72 (1993) 3, 22–28.
66 Scholler, H.: Vorwort. In: Scholler, H.–Tellenbach, S. (hrsg.): Die Bedeutung der Lehre vom 
Rechtskreis und der Rechtskultur. Berlin, 2001, 7–11.
67 Cf., e.g. Varga, Cs.: Jogﬁ lozóﬁ a az ezredfordulón. Minták, kényszerek – múltban, jelenben 
[Philosophy of law at the millennial turn: Patterns and coercions in the past and present]. Budapest, 
2004, 9–66.
